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Abstract
The goal of a decision-based adversarial attack on a trained model is to generate adversarial examples based solely on
observing output labels returned by the targeted model. We develop HopSkipJumpAttack1, a family of algorithms based on a
novel estimate of the gradient direction using binary information at the decision boundary. The proposed family includes both
untargeted and targeted attacks optimized for `2 and `∞ similarity metrics respectively. Theoretical analysis is provided for
the proposed algorithms and the gradient direction estimate. Experiments show HopSkipJumpAttack requires significantly
fewer model queries than Boundary Attack. It also achieves competitive performance in attacking several widely-used defense
mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Although deep neural networks have achieved state-of-the-art performance on a variety of tasks, they have been shown to be
vulnerable to adversarial examples—that is, maliciously perturbed examples that are almost identical to original samples in
human perception, but cause models to make incorrect decisions [1]. The vulnerability of neural networks to adversarial exam-
ples implies a security risk in applications with real-world consequences, such as self-driving cars, robotics, financial services,
and criminal justice; in addition, it highlights fundamental differences between human learning and existing machine-based
systems. The study of adversarial examples is thus necessary to identify the limitation of current machine learning algorithms,
provide a metric for robustness, investigate the potential risk, and suggest ways to improve the robustness of models.
Recent years have witnessed a flurry of research on the design of new algorithms for generating adversarial examples [1–16].
Adversarial examples can be categorized according to at least three different criteria: the similarity metric, the attack goal,
and the threat model. Commonly used similarity metrics are `p-distances between adversarial and original examples with
p ∈ {0, 2,∞}. The goal of attack is either untargeted or targeted. The goal of an untargeted attack is to perturb the input
so as to cause any type of misclassification, whereas the goal of a targeted attack is to alter the decision of the model to a
pre-specific target class. Changing the loss function allows for switching between two types of attacks [3, 5, 6].
Perhaps the most important criterion in practice is the threat model, of which there are two primary types: white-box and
black-box. In the white-box setting, an attacker has complete access to the model, including its structure and weights. Under
this setting, the generation of adversarial examples is often formulated as an optimization problem, which is solved either via
treating misclassification loss as a regularization [1, 6] or via tackling the dual as a constrained optimization problem [2, 3, 7].
In the black-box setting, an attacker can only access outputs of the target model. Based on whether one has access to the
full probability or the label of a given input, black-box attacks are further divided into score-based and decision-based. See
Figure 1 for an illustration of accessible components of the target model for each of the three threat models. Chen et al. [8]
and Ilyas et al. [9, 10] introduced score-based methods using zeroth-order gradient estimation to craft adversarial examples.
1HopSkipJumpAttack was named Boundary Attack++ in a previous version of the preprint.
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Figure 1. An illustration of accessible components of the target model for each of the three threat models. A white-box threat
model assumes access to the whole model; a score-based threat model assumes access to the output layer; a decision-based threat
model assumes access to the predicted label alone.
The most practical threat model is that in which an attacker has access to decisions alone. A widely studied type of the
decision-based attack is transfer-based attack. Liu et al. [11] showed that adversarial examples generated on an ensemble
of deep neural networks from a white-box attack can be transferred to an unseen neural network. Papernot et al. [12, 13]
proposed to train a substitute model by querying the target model. However, transfer-based attack often requires a carefully-
designed substitute model, or even access to part of the training data. Moreover, they can be defended against via training
on a data set augmented by adversarial examples from multiple static pre-trained models [17]. In recent work, Brendel
et al. [14] proposed Boundary Attack, which generates adversarial examples via rejection sampling. While relying neither
on training data nor on the assumption of transferability, this attack method achieves comparable performance with state-of-
the-art white-box attacks such as C&W attack [6]. One limitation of Boundary Attack, however, is that it was formulated
only for `2-distance. Moreover, it requires a relatively large number of model queries, rendering it impractical for real-world
applications.
It is more realistic to evaluate the vulnerability of a machine learning system under the decision-based attack with a limited
budget of model queries. Online image classification platforms often set a limit on the allowed number of queries within
a certain time period. For example, the cloud vision API from Google currently allow 1,800 requests per minute. Query
inefficiency thus leads to clock-time inefficiency and prevents an attacker from carrying out large-scale attacks. A system
may also be set to recognize the behavior of feeding a large number of similar queries within a small amount of time as a
fraud, which will automatically filter out query-inefficient decision-based attacks. Last but not least, a smaller query budget
directly implies less cost in evaluation and research. Query-efficient algorithms help save the cost of evaluating the robustness
of public platforms, which incur a cost for each query made by the attacker. It also helps facilitate research in adversarial
vulnerability, as such a decision-based attack which does not require access to model details may be used as a simple and
efficient first step in evaluating new defense mechanisms, as we will see in Section 5.2 and 5.3.
In this paper, we study decision-based attacks under an optimization framework, and propose a novel family of algorithms
for generating both targeted and untargeted adversarial examples that are optimized for minimum distance with respect to
either the `2-distance or `∞ distance. The family of algorithms is iterative in nature, with each iteration involving three steps:
estimation of the gradient direction, step-size search via geometric progression, and Boundary search via a binary search.
Theoretical analysis has been carried out for the optimization framework and the gradient direction estimate, which not only
provides insights for choosing hyperparamters, but also motivating essential steps in the proposed algorithms. We refer to
the algorithm as HopSkipJumpAttack2. In summary, our contributions are the following:
• We propose a novel unbiased estimate of gradient direction at the decision boundary based solely on access to model
decisions, and propose ways to control the error from deviation from the boundary.
2A hop, skip, and a jump originally referred to an exercise or game involving these movements dating from the early 1700s, but by the mid-1800s it was
also being used figuratively for the short distance so covered.
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• We design a family of algorithms, HopSkipJumpAttack, based on the proposed estimate and our analysis, which is
hyperparameter-free, query-efficient and equipped with a convergence analysis.
• We demonstrate the superior efficiency of our algorithm over several state-of-the-art decision-based attacks through exten-
sive experiments.
• Through the evaluation of several defense mechanisms such as defensive distillation, region-based classification, adversar-
ial training and input binarization, we suggest our attack can be used as a simple and efficient first step for researchers to
evaluate new defense mechanisms.
Roadmap. In Section 2, we describe previous work on decision-based adversarial attacks and their relationship to our
algorithm. We also discuss the connection of our algorithm to zeroth-order optimization. In Section 3, we propose and
analyze a novel iterative algorithm which requires access to the gradient information. Each step carries out a gradient update
from the boundary, and then projects back to the boundary again. In Section 4, we introduce a novel asymptotically unbiased
gradient-direction estimate at the boundary, and a binary-search procedure to approach the boundary. We also discuss how
to control errors with deviation from the boundary. The analysis motivates a decision-based algorithm, HopSkipJumpAttack
(Algorithm 2). Experimental results are provided in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6 with a discussion of future work.
2 Related work
2.1 Decision-based attacks
Most related to our work is the Boundary Attack method introduced by Brendel et al. [14]. Boundary Attack is an iterative
algorithm based on rejective sampling, initialized at an image that lies in the target class. At each step, a perturbation is
sampled from a proposal distribution, which reduces the distance of the perturbed image towards the original input. If the
perturbed image still lies in the target class, the perturbation is kept. Otherwise, the perturbation is dropped. Boundary Attack
achieves performance comparable to state-of-the-art white-box attacks on deep neural networks for image classification. The
key obstacle to its practical application is, however, the demand for a large number of model queries. In practice, the required
number of model queries for crafting an adversarial example directly determines the level of the threat imposed by a decision-
based attack. One source of inefficiency in Boundary Attack is the rejection of perturbations which deviate from the target
class. In our algorithm, the perturbations are used for estimation of a gradient direction.
Several other decision-based attacks have been proposed to improve efficiency. Brunner et al. [15] introduced Biased Bound-
ary Attack, which biases the sampling procedure by combining low-frequency random noise with the gradient from a substi-
tute model. Biased Boundary Attack is able to significantly reduce the number of model queries. However, it relies on the
transferability between the substitute model and the target model, as with other transfer-based attacks. Our algorithm does
not rely on the additional assumption of transferability. Instead, it achieves a significant improvement over Boundary Attack
through the exploitation of discarded information into the gradient-direction estimation. Ilyas et al. [9] proposed Limited
attack in the label-only setting, which directly performs projected gradient descent by estimating gradients based on novel
proxy scores. Cheng et al. [16] introduced Opt attack, which transforms the original problem to a continuous version, and
solves the new problem via randomized zeroth-order gradient update. Our algorithm approaches the original problem directly
via a novel gradient-direction estimate, leading to improved query efficiency over both Limited Attack and Opt Attack. The
majority of model queries in HopSkipJumpAttack come in mini-batches, which also leads to improved clock-time efficiency
over Boundary Attack.
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2.2 Zeroth-order optimization
Zeroth-order optimization refers to the problem of optimizing a function f based only on access to function values f(x),
as opposed to gradient values ∇f(x). Such problems have been extensively studied in the convex optimization and bandit
literatures. Flaxman et al. [18] studied one-point randomized estimate of gradient for bandit convex optimization. Agarwal
et al. [19] and Nesterov and Spokoiny [20] demonstrated that faster convergence can be achieved by using two function
evaluations for estimating the gradient. Duchi et al. [21] established optimal rates of convex zeroth-order optimization via
mirror descent with two-point gradient estimates. Zeroth-order algorithms have been applied to the generation of adversarial
examples under the score-based threat model [8–10]. Subsequent work [22] proposed and analyzed an algorithm based on
variance-reduced stochastic gradient estimates.
We formulate decision-based attack as an optimization problem. A core component of our proposed algorithm is a gradient-
direction estimate, the design of which is motivated by zeroth-order optimization. However, the problem of decision-based
attack is more challenging than zeroth-order optimization, essentially because we only have binary information from output
labels of the target model, rather than function values.
3 An optimization framework
In this section, we describe an optimization framework for finding adversarial instances for an m-ary classification model
of the following type. The first component is a discriminant function F : Rd → Rm that accepts an input x ∈ [0, 1]d and
produces an output y ∈ ∆m := {y ∈ [0, 1]m |
∑m
c=1 yc = 1}. The output vector y = (F1(x), . . . , Fm(x)) can be viewed as
a probability distribution over the label set [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. Based on the function F , the classifier C : Rd → [m] assigns
input x to the class with maximum probability—that is,
C(x) := arg max
c∈[m]
Fc(x).
We study adversaries of both the untargeted and targeted varieties. Given some input x?, the goal of an untargeted attack is
to change the original classifier decision c? := C(x?) to any c ∈ [m]\{c?}, whereas the goal of a targeted attack is to change
the decision to some pre-specified c† ∈ [m]\{c?}. Formally, if we define the function Sx? : Rd → R via
Sx?(x
′) :=
maxc6=c? Fc(x
′)− Fc?(x′) (Untargeted)
Fc†(x
′)−max
c6=c†
Fc(x
′) (Targeted)
(1)
then a perturbed image x′ is a successful attack if and only if Sx?(x′) > 0. The boundary between successful and unsuccessful
perturbed images is
bd(Sx?) :=
{
z ∈ [0, 1]d | Sx?(z) = 0
}
.
As an indicator of successful perturbation, we introduce the Boolean-valued function φx? : [0, 1]d → {−1, 1} via
φx?(x
′) := sign (Sx?(x′)) =
{
1 if Sx?(x′) > 0,
−1 otherwise.
This function is accessible in the decision-based setting, as it can be computed by querying the classifier C alone. The goal of
an adversarial attack is to generate a perturbed sample x′ such that φx?(x′) = 1, while keeping x′ close to the original sample
x?. This can be formulated as the optimization problem
min
x′
d(x′, x?) such that φx?(x′) = 1, (2)
where d is a distance function that quantifies similarity. Standard choices of d studied in past work [5, 2, 6] include the usual
`p-norms, for p ∈ {0, 2,∞}.
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3.1 An iterative algorithm for `2 distance
Consider the case of the optimization problem (2) with the `2-norm d(x, x?) = ‖x − x?‖2. We first specify an iterative
algorithm that is given access to the gradient∇Sx? . Given an initial vector x0 such that Sx?(x0) > 0 and a stepsize sequence
{ξt}t≥0, it performs the update
xt+1 = αtx
? + (1− αt)
{
xt + ξt
∇Sx?(xt)
‖∇Sx?(xt)‖2
}
, (3)
where ξt is a positive step size. Here the line search parameter αt ∈ [0, 1] is chosen such that Sx?(xt+1) = 0—that is, so that
the next iterate xt+1 lies on the boundary. The motivation for this choice is that our gradient-direction estimate in Section 4
is only valid near the boundary.
We now analyze this algorithm with the assumption that we have access to the gradient of Sx? in the setting of binary
classification. Assume that the function Sx? is twice differentiable with a locally Lipschitz gradient, meaning that there exists
L > 0 such that for all x, y ∈ {z : ‖z − x?‖2 ≤ ‖x0 − x?‖2}, we have
‖∇Sx?(x)−∇Sx?(y)‖2 ≤ L‖x− y‖2, (4)
where x0 is the initialization point. In addition, we assume the gradient is bounded away from zero on the boundary: there
exists a positive c > 0 such that ‖∇Sx?(z)‖ > c for any z ∈ bd(Sx?).
We analyze the behavior of the updates (3) in terms of the angular measure
r(xt, x
?) := cos∠ (xt − x?,∇Sx?(xt))
=
〈
xt − x?, ∇Sx?(xt)
〉
‖xt − x?‖2‖∇Sx?(xt)‖2 ,
corresponding to the cosine of the angle between xt − x? and the gradient ∇Sx?(xt). Note that the condition r(x, x?) = 1
holds if and only if x is a stationary point of the optimization (2). The following theorem guarantees that, with a suitable step
size, the updates converge to such a stationary point:
Theorem 1. Under the previously stated conditions on Sx? , suppose that we compute the updates (3) with the step size
ξt = ‖xt − x?‖2t−q for some q ∈
(
1
4 ,
1
2
)
. Then there is a universal constant c such that
0 ≤ 1− r(xt, x?) ≤ c 1
t
1
2−q
for all iterations t = 1, 2, . . .. (5)
In particular, the algorithm converges to a stationary point of problem (2).
Theorem 1 suggests a scheme for choosing the step size in the algorithm that we present in the next section. An experimental
evaluation of the proposed scheme is carried out in Section 5.4. The proof of the theorem is constructed by establishing the
relationship between the objective value d(xt, x?) and r(xt, x?), with a second-order Taylor approximation to the boundary.
See Appendix A.1 for details.
3.2 Extension to `∞-distance
We now describe how to extend these updates so as to minimize the `∞-distance. Consider the `2-projection of a point x onto
the sphere of radius αt centered at x?:
Π2x?,αt(x) := arg min‖y−x?‖2≤αt
‖y − x‖2 = αtx? + (1− αt)x. (6)
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In terms of this operator, our `2-based update (3) can be rewritten in the equivalent form
xt+1 = Π
2
x?,αt
(
xt + ξt
∇Sx?(xt)
‖∇Sx?(xt)‖2
)
. (7)
This perspective allows us to extend the algorithm to other `p-norms for p 6= 2. For instance, in the case p = ∞, we can
define the `∞-projection operator Π∞x?,α. It performs a per-pixel clip within a neighborhood of x
?, such that the ith entry of
Π∞x?,α(x) is
Π∞x?,α(x)i := max {min{x?i , x?i + c} , xi − c},
where c := α‖x− x?‖∞. We propose the `∞-version of our algorithm by carrying out the following update iteratively:
xt+1 = Π
∞
x?,αt
(
xt + ξtsign(∇Sx?(xt))
)
, (8)
where αt is chosen such that Sx?(xt+1) = 0, and “sign” returns the element-wise sign of a vector. We use the sign of the
gradient for faster convergence in practice, similar to previous work [2, 3, 7]. We also provide a detailed discussion on the
connection of our optimization framework with existing white-box algorithms in Appendix B.
4 A decision-based algorithm based on a novel gradient estimate
We now extend our procedures to the decision-based setting, in which we have access only to the Boolean-valued function
φx?(x) = sign(Sx?(x))—that is, the method cannot observe the underlying discriminant function F or its gradient. In this
section, we introduce a gradient-direction estimate based on φx? when xt ∈ bd(Sx?) (so that Sx?(xt) = 0 by definition). We
proceed to discuss how to approach the boundary. Then we discuss how to control the error of our estimate with a deviation
from the boundary. We will summarize the analysis with a decision-based algorithm.
4.1 At the boundary
Given an iterate xt ∈ bd(Sx?) we propose to approximate the direction of the gradient ∇Sx?(xt) via the Monte Carlo
estimate
∇˜S(xt, δ) := 1
B
B∑
b=1
φx?(xt + δub)ub, (9)
where {ub}Bb=1 are i.i.d. draws from the uniform distribution over the d-dimensional sphere, and δ is small positive parameter.
(The dependence of this estimator on the fixed centering point x? is omitted for notational simplicity.)
The perturbation parameter δ is necessary, but introduces a form of bias in the estimate. Our first result controls this bias, and
shows that ∇˜S(xt, δ) is asymptotically unbiased as δ → 0+.
Theorem 2. For a boundary point xt, suppose that Sx? has L-Lipschitz gradients in a neighborhood of xt. Then the cosine
of the angle between ∇˜S(xt, δ) and ∇Sx?(xt) is bounded as
cos∠
(
E[∇˜S(xt, δ)],∇Sx?(xt)
)
≥ 1− 9L
2δ2d2
8‖∇S(xt)‖22
. (10)
In particular, we have
lim
δ→0
cos∠
(
E[∇˜S(xt, δ)],∇Sx?(xt)
)
= 1, (11)
showing that the estimate is asymptotically unbiased as an estimate of direction.
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We remark that Theorem 2 only establishes the asymptotic behavior of the proposed estiamte at the boundary. This also
motivates the boundary search step in our algorithm to be discussed in Seciton 4.2. The proof of Theorem 2 starts from
dividing the unit sphere into three components: the upper cap along the direction of gradient, the lower cap opposite to
the direction of gradient, and the annulus in between. The error from the annulus can be bounded when δ is small. See
Appendix A.2 for the proof of this theorem. As will be seen in the sequel, the size of perturbation δ should be chosen
proportionally to d−1; see Section 4.3 for details.
4.2 Approaching the boundary
The proposed estimate (9) is only valid at the boundary. We now describe how we approach the boundary via a binary search.
Let x˜t denote the updated sample before the operator Πpx,αt is applied:
x˜t := xt + ξtvt(xt, δt), such that (12)
vt(xt, δt) =
{
∇̂S(xt, δt)/‖∇̂S(xt, δt)‖2, if p = 2,
sign(∇̂S(xt, δt)), if p =∞,
where ∇̂S will be introduced later in equation (16), as a variance-reduced version of ∇˜S, and δt is the size of perturbation at
the t-th step.
We hope x˜t is at the opposite side of the boundary to x so that the binary search can be carried out. Therefore, we initialize
at x˜0 at the target side with φx?(x˜0) = 1, and set x0 := Πpx,α0(x˜0), where α0 is chosen via a binary search between 0 and 1
to approach the boundary, stopped at x0 lying on the target side with φx?(x0) = 1. At the t-th iteration, we start at xt lying
at the target side φx?(xt) = 1. The step size is initialized as
ξt := ‖xt − x?‖p/
√
t, (13)
as suggested by Theorem 1 in the `2 case, and is decreased by half until φx?(x˜t) = 1, which we call geometric progression
of ξt. Having found an appropriate x˜t, we choose the projection radius αt via a binary search between 0 and 1 to approach
the boundary, which stops at xt+1 with φx?(xt+1) = 1. See Algorithm 1 for the complete binary search, where the binary
search threshold θ is set to be some small constant.
Algorithm 1 Bin-Search
Require: Samples x′, x, with a binary function φ, such that φ(x′) = 1, φ(x) = 0, threshold θ, constraint `p.
Ensure: A sample x′′ near the boundary.
Set αl = 0 and αu = 1.
while |αl − αu| > θ do
Set αm ← αl+αu2 .
if φ(Πx,αm(x′)) = 1 then
Set αu ← αm.
else
Set αl ← αm.
end if
end while
Output x′′ = Πx,αu(x
′).
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4.3 Controlling errors of deviations from the boundary
Binary search never places xt+1 exactly onto the boundary. We analyze the error of the gradient-direction estimate, and
propose two approaches for reducing the error.
Appropriate choice of the size of random perturbation First, the size of random perturbation δt for estimating the gra-
dient direction is chosen as a function of image size d and the binary search threshold θ. This is different from numerical
differentiation, where the optimal choice of δt is at the scale of round-off errors (e.g., [23]). Below we characterize the error
incurred by a large δt as a function of distance between x˜t and the boundary, and derive the appropriate choice of ξt and δt.
In fact, with a Taylor approximation of Sx? at xt, we have
Sx?(xt + δtu) = Sx?(xt) + δt
〈∇Sx?(xt), u〉+O(δ2t ).
At the boundary Sx?(xt) = 0, the error of gradient approximation scales at O(δ2t ), which is minimized by reducing δt to the
scale of rooted round-off error. However, the outcome xt of a finite-step binary search lies close to, but not exactly on the
boundary.
When δt is small enough such that second-order terms can be omitted, the first-order Taylor approximation implies that
φx?(xt + δtu) = −1 if and only if xt + δtu lies on the spherical cap C, with
C :=
{
u |
〈 ∇Sx?(xt)
‖∇Sx?(xt)‖2 , u
〉
< −δ−1t
Sx?(xt)
‖∇Sx?(xt)‖2
}
.
On the other hand, the probability mass of u concentrates on the equator in a high-dimensional sphere, which is characterized
by the following inequality [24]:
P(u ∈ C) ≤ 2
c
exp{−c
2
2
},where c =
√
d− 2Sx?(xt)
δt‖∇Sx?(xt)‖2 . (14)
A Taylor expansion of xt at x′t := Π
2
∂(xt) yields
Sx?(xt) = ∇Sx?(x′t)T (xt − x′t) +O(‖xt − x′t‖22)
= ∇Sx?(xt)T (xt − x′t) +O(‖xt − x′t‖22).
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the definition of `2-projection, we have
|∇Sx?(xt)T (xt − x′t)|
≤ ‖∇Sx?(xt)‖2‖xt −Π2∂(xt)‖2
≤
{
‖∇Sx?(xt)‖2θ‖x˜t−1 − x?‖p, if p = 2,
‖∇Sx?(xt)‖2θ‖x˜t−1 − x?‖p
√
d, if p =∞.
This yields
c = O(d
qθ‖x˜t−1 − x?‖p
δt
),
where q = 1 − (1/p) is the dual exponent. In order to avoid a loss of accuracy from concentration of measure, we let
δt = d
qθ‖x˜t−1 − x?‖2. To make the approximation error independent of dimension d, we set θ at the scale of d−q−1, so that
δt is proportional to d−1, as suggested by Theorem 2. This leads to a logarithmic dependence on dimension for the number
of model queries. In practice, we set
θ = d−q−1; δt = d−1‖x˜t−1 − x?‖p. (15)
A baseline for variance reduction in gradient-direction estimation Another source of error comes from the variance of
the estimate, where we characterize variance of a random vector v ∈ Rd by the trace of its covariance operator: Var(v) :=
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Algorithm 2 HopSkipJumpAttack
Require: Classifier C, a sample x, constraint `p, initial batch size B0, iterations T .
Ensure: Perturbed image xt.
Set θ (Equation (15)).
Initialize at x˜0 with φx?(x˜0) = 1.
Compute d0 = ‖x˜0 − x?‖p.
for t in 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 do
(Boundary search)
xt = BIN-SEARCH(x˜t−1, x, θ, φx? , p)
(Gradient-direction estimation)
Sample Bt = B0
√
t unit vectors u1, . . . , uBt .
Set δt (Equation (15)).
Compute vt(xt, δt) (Equation (12)).
(Step size search)
Initialize step size ξt = ‖xt − x?‖p/
√
t.
while φx?(xt + εtvt) = 0 do
ξt ← ξt/2.
end while
Set x˜t = xt + ξtvt.
Compute dt = ‖x˜t − x?‖p.
end for
Output xt = BIN-SEARCH(x˜t−1, x, θ, φx? , p).∑d
i=1 Var(vi). When xt deviates from the boundary and δt is not exactly zero, there is an uneven distribution of perturbed
samples at the two sides of the boundary:
|E[φx?(xt + δtu)]| > 0,
as we can see from Equation (14). To attempt to control the variance, we introduce a baseline φx? into the estimate:
φx? :=
1
B
B∑
b=1
φx?(xt + δub),
which yields the following estimate:
∇̂S(xt, δ) := 1
B − 1
B∑
b=1
(φx?(xt + δub)− φx?)ub. (16)
It can be easily observed that this estimate is equal to the previous estimate in expectation, and thus still asymptotically
unbiased at the boundary: When xt ∈ bd(Sx?), we have
cos∠
(
E[∇̂S(xt, δ)],∇Sx?(xt)
)
≥ 1− 9L
2δ2d2
8‖∇S(xt)‖22
,
lim
δ→0
cos∠
(
E[∇̂S(xt, δ)],∇Sx?(xt)
)
= 1.
Moreover, the introduction of the baseline reduces the variance when E[φx?(xt + δu)] deviates from zero. In particular, the
following theorem shows that whenever |E[φx?(xt + δu)]| = Ω(B− 12 ), the introduction of a baseline reduces the variance.
Theorem 3. Defining σ2 := Var(φx?(xt + δu)u) as the variance of one-point estimate, we have
Var(∇̂S(xt, δ)) < Var(∇˜S(xt, δ))(1− ψ),
where
ψ =
2
σ2(B − 1)
(
2BE[φx?(xt + δu)]2 − 1
)− 2B − 1
(B − 1)2 .
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Figure 2. Intuitive explanation of HopSkipJumpAttack. (a) Perform a binary search to find the boundary, and then update x˜t → xt.
(b) Estimate the gradient at the boundary point xt. (c) Geometric progression and then update xt → x˜t+1. (d) Perform a binary
search, and then update x˜t+1 → xt+1.
See Appendix A.3 for the proof. We also present an experimental evaluation of our gradient-direction estimate when the
sample deviates from the boundary in Section 5.4, where we show our proposed choice of δt and the introduction of baseline
yield a performance gain in estimating gradient.
4.4 HopSkipJumpAttack
We now combine the above analysis into an iterative algorithm, HopSkipJumpAttack. It is initialized with a sample in the
target class for untargeted attack, and with a sample blended with uniform noise that is misclassified for targeted attack. Each
iteration of the algorithm has three components. First, the iterate from the last iteration is pushed towards the boundary via a
binary search (Algorithm 1). Second, the gradient direction is estimated via Equation (16). Third, the updating step size along
the gradient direction is initialized as Equation (13) based on Theorem 1, and is decreased via geometric progression until
perturbation becomes successful. The next iteration starts with projecting the perturbed sample back to the boundary again.
The complete procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2. Figure 2 provides an intuitive visualization of the three steps in `2.
For all experiments, we initialize the batch size at 100 and increase it with
√
t linearly, so that the variance of the estimate
reduces with t. When the input domain is bounded in practice, a clip is performed at each step by default.
5 Experiments
In this section, we carry out experimental analysis of HopSkipJumpAttack. We compare the efficiency of HopSkipJumpAttack
with several previously proposed decision-based attacks on image classification tasks. In addition, we evaluate the robustness
of three defense mechanisms under our attack method. We also evaluate the performance of HopSkipJumpAttack on models
without gradients. Finally, we carry out sensitivity analysis to validate the choice of hyperparameters suggested by previous
analysis. All experiments were carried out on a Tesla K80 GPU, with code for the experiments available on GitHub3. Our
algorithm is also available on CleverHans [25] and Foolbox [26], which are two popular Python packages to craft adversarial
examples for machine learning models.
3https://github.com/Jianbo-Lab/HSJA
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Table 1. Median distance at various model queries. The smaller median distance at a given model query is bold-faced. BA and
HSJA stand for Boundary Attack and HopSkipJumpAttack respectively.
Distance Data Model Objective
Model Queries
1K 5K 20K
BA Opt HSJA BA Opt HSJA BA Opt HSJA
`2
MNIST CNN Untargeted 6.14 6.79 2.46 5.45 3.76 1.67 1.50 2.07 1.48Targeted 5.41 4.84 3.26 5.38 3.90 2.24 1.98 2.49 1.96
CIFAR10
ResNet Untargeted 2.78 2.07 0.56 2.34 0.77 0.21 0.27 0.29 0.13Targeted 7.83 8.21 2.53 5.91 4.76 0.41 0.59 1.06 0.21
DenseNet Untargeted 2.57 1.78 0.48 2.12 0.67 0.18 0.21 0.28 0.12Targeted 7.70 7.65 1.75 5.33 3.47 0.34 0.35 0.78 0.19
CIFAR100
ResNet Untargeted 1.34 1.20 0.20 1.12 0.41 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.06Targeted 9.30 12.43 6.12 7.40 8.34 0.92 1.61 4.06 0.29
DenseNet Untargeted 1.47 1.22 0.25 1.23 0.34 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.08Targeted 8.83 11.72 5.10 6.76 8.22 0.75 0.91 2.89 0.26
ImageNet ResNet Untargeted 36.86 33.60 9.75 31.95 13.91 2.30 2.71 5.26 0.84Targeted 87.49 84.38 71.99 82.91 71.83 38.79 40.92 53.78 10.95
`∞
MNIST CNN Untargeted 0.788 0.641 0.235 0.700 0.587 0.167 0.243 0.545 0.136Targeted 0.567 0.630 0.298 0.564 0.514 0.211 0.347 0.325 0.175
CIFAR10
ResNet Untargeted 0.127 0.128 0.023 0.105 0.096 0.008 0.019 0.073 0.005Targeted 0.379 0.613 0.134 0.289 0.353 0.028 0.038 0.339 0.010
DenseNet Untargeted 0.114 0.119 0.017 0.095 0.078 0.007 0.017 0.063 0.004Targeted 0.365 0.629 0.130 0.249 0.359 0.022 0.025 0.338 0.008
CIFAR100
ResNet Untargeted 0.061 0.077 0.009 0.051 0.055 0.004 0.008 0.040 0.002Targeted 0.409 0.773 0.242 0.371 0.472 0.124 0.079 0.415 0.019
DenseNet Untargeted 0.065 0.076 0.010 0.055 0.038 0.005 0.010 0.030 0.003Targeted 0.388 0.750 0.248 0.314 0.521 0.096 0.051 0.474 0.017
ImageNet ResNet Untargeted 0.262 0.287 0.057 0.234 0.271 0.017 0.030 0.248 0.007Targeted 0.615 0.872 0.329 0.596 0.615 0.219 0.326 0.486 0.091
5.1 Efficiency evaluation
Baselines We compare HopSkipJumpAttack with three state-of-the-art decision-based attacks: Boundary Attack [14], Lim-
ited Attack [9] and Opt Attack [16]. We use the implementation of the three algorithms with the suggested hyper-parameters
from the publicly available source code online. Limited Attack is only included under the targeted `∞ setting.
Data and models For a comprehensive evaluation of HopSkipJumpAttack, we use a wide range of data and models, with
varied image dimensions, data set sizes, complexity levels of task and model structures. The experiments are carried out over
four image data sets: MNIST, CIFAR-10 [27], CIFAR-100 [27], and ImageNet [28] with the standard train/test split [29].
The four data sets have varied image dimensions and class numbers. MNIST contains 70K 28 × 28 gray-scale images of
handwritten digits in the range 0-9. CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 are both composed of 32× 32× 3 images. CIFAR-10 has 10
classes, with 6K images per class, while CIFAR-100 has 100 classes, with 600 images per class. ImageNet has 1, 000 classes.
Images in ImageNet are rescaled to 224 × 224 × 3. For MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, 1, 000 correctly classified test
images are used, which are randomly drawn from the test data set, and evenly distributed across classes. For ImageNet, we
use 100 correctly classified test images, evenly distributed among 10 randomly selected classes. The selection scheme follows
Metzen et al. [30] for reproducibility.
We also use models of varied structure, from simple to complex. For MNIST, we use a simple convolutional network com-
posed of two convolutional layers followed by a hidden dense layer with 1024 units. Two convolutional layers have 32, 64
filters respectively, each of which is followed by a max-pooling layer. For both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we train a 20-
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Figure 3. Median distance versus number of model queries on MNIST with CNN, and CIFAR-10 with ResNet and DenseNet from
top to bottom rows. 1st column: untargeted `2. 2nd col.: targeted `2. 3rd col.: untargeted `∞. 4th col.: targeted `∞.
layer ResNet [31] and 121-layer DenseNet [32] respectively, with the canonical network structure [29]. For ImageNet, we
use a pre-trained 50-layer ResNet [31]. All models achieve close to state-of-the-art accuracy on the respective data set. All
pixels are scaled to be in the range [0, 1]. For all experiments, we clip the perturbed image into the input domain [0, 1] for all
algorithms by default.
Initialization For untargeted attack, we initialize all attacks by blending an original image with uniform random noise, and
increasing the weight of uniform noise gradually until it is misclassified, a procedure which is available on a widely-used
python package, Foolbox [26], as the default initialization of Boundary Attack. For targeted attack, the target class is sampled
uniformly among the incorrect labels. An image belonging to the target class is randomly sampled from the test set as the
initialization. The same target class and a common initialization image are used for all attacks.
Metrics The first metric is the median `p distance between perturbed and original samples over a subset of test images,
which was commonly used in previous work, such as Carlini and Wagner [6]. A version normalized by image dimension was
employed by Brendel et al. [14] for evaluating Boundary Attack. The `2 distance can be interpreted in the following way:
Given a byte image of size h×w×3, perturbation of size d in `2 distance on the rescaled input image amounts to perturbation
on the original image of dd/√h× w × 3 ∗ 255e bits per pixel on average, in the range [0, 255]. The perturbation of size d in
`∞ distance amounts to a maximum perturbation of d255 · de bits across all pixels on the raw image.
As an alternative metric, we also plot the success rate at various distance thresholds for both algorithms given a limited budget
of model queries. An adversarial example is defined a success if the size of perturbation does not exceed a given distance
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Figure 4. Median distance versus number of model queries on CIFAR-100 with ResNet, DenseNet, and ImageNet with ResNet
from top to bottom rows. 1st column: untargeted `2. 2nd col.: targeted `2. 3rd col.: untargeted `∞. 4th col.: targeted `∞.
threshold. The success rate can be directly related to the accuracy of a model on perturbed data under a given distance
threshold:
perturbed acc. = original acc.× (1− success rate). (17)
Throughout the experiments, we limit the maximum budget of queries per image to 25,000, the setting of practical interest,
due to limited computational resources.
Results Figure 3 and 4 show the median distance (on a log scale) against the queries, with the first and third quartiles used
as lower and upper error bars. For Boundary, Opt and HopSkipJumpAttack, Table 1 summarizes the median distance when
the number of queries is fixed at 1,000, 5,000, and 20,000 across all distance types, data, models and objectives. Figure 5 and
6 show the success rate against the distance threshold. Figure 3 and 5 contain results on MNIST with CNN, and CIFAR-10
with ResNet, Denset, subsequently from the top row to the bottom row. Figure 4 and 6 contain results on CIFAR-100 with
ResNet and DenseNet, and ImageNet with ResNet, subsequently from the top row to the bottom row. The four columns are
for untargeted `2, targeted `2, untargeted `∞ and targeted `∞ attacks respectively.
With a limited number of queries, HopSkipJumpAttack is able to craft adversarial examples of a significantly smaller distance
with the corresponding original examples across all data sets, followed by Boundary Attack and Opt Attack. As a concrete
example, Table 1 shows that untargeted `2-optimized HopSkipJumpAttack achieves a median distance of 0.559 on CIFAR-10
with a ResNet model at 1, 000 queries, which amounts to below 3/255 per pixel on average. At the same budget of queries,
Boundary Attack and Opt Attack only achieve median `2-distances of 2.78 and 2.07 respectively. The difference in efficiency
becomes more significant for `∞ attacks. As shown in Figure 5, under an untargeted `∞-optimized HopSkipJumpAttack with
1,000 queries, all pixels are within an 8/255-neighborhood of the original image for around 70% of adversarial examples, a
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Figure 5. Success rate versus distance threshold for MNIST with CNN, and CIFAR-10 with ResNet, DenseNet from top to bottom
rows. 1st column: untargeted `2. 2nd column: targeted `2. 3rd column: untargeted `∞. 4th column: targeted `∞.
success rate achieved by Boundary Attack only after 20,000 queries.
By comparing the odd and even columns of Figure 3-6, we can find that targeted HopSkipJumpAttack takes more queries than
the untargeted one to achieve a comparable distance. This phenomenon becomes more explicit on CIFAR-100 and ImageNet,
which have more classes. With the same number of queries, there is an order-of-magnitude difference in median distance
between untargeted and targeted attacks (Figure 3 and 4). For `2-optimized HopSkipJumpAttack, while the untargeted version
is able to craft adversarial images by perturbing 4 bits per pixel on average within 1,000 queries for 70%− 90% of images in
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, the targeted counterpart takes 2,000-5,000 queries. The other attacks fail to achieve a comparable
performance even with 25,000 queries. On ImageNet, untargeted `2-optimized HopSkipJumpAttack is able to fool the model
with a perturbation of size 6 bits per pixel on average for close to 50% of images with 1, 000 queries; untargeted `∞-
optimized HopSkipJumpAttack controls the maximum perturbation across all pixels within 16 bits for 50% images within
1, 000 queries. The targeted Boundary Attack is not able to control the perturbation size to such a small scale until after around
25, 000 queries. On the one hand, the larger query budget requirement results from a strictly more powerful formulation of
targeted attack than untargeted attack. On the other hand, this is also because we initialize targeted HopSkipJumpAttack from
an arbitrary image in the target class. The algorithm may be trapped in a bad local minimum with such an initialization.
Future work can address systematic approaches to better initialization.
As a comparison between data sets and models, we see that adversarial images often have a larger distance to their corre-
sponding original images on MNIST than on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, which has also been observed in previous work (e.g.,
[6]). This might be because it is more difficult to fool a model on simpler tasks. On the other hand, HopSkipJumpAttack also
converges in a fewer number of queries on MNIST, as is shown in Figure 3. It does not converge even after 25, 000 queries
on ImageNet. We conjecture the query budget is related to the input dimension, and the smoothness of decision boundary.
We also observe the difference in model structure does not have a large influence on decision-based algorithms, if the training
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Figure 6. Success rate versus distance threshold for CIFAR-100 with ResNet, DenseNet, and ImageNet with ResNet from top to
bottom rows. 1st column: untargeted `2. 2nd column: targeted `2. 3rd column: untargeted `∞. 4th column: targeted `∞.
algorithm and the data set keep the same. For ResNet and DenseNet trained on a common data set, a decision-based algorithm
achieves comparable performance in crafting adversarial examples, although DenseNet has a more complex structure than
ResNet.
As a comparison with state-of-the-art white-box targeted attacks, C&W attack [6] achieves an average `2-distance of 0.33 on
CIFAR-10, and BIM [3] achieves an average `∞-distance of 0.014 on CIFAR-10. Targeted HopSkipJumpAttack achieves a
comparable distance with 5K-10K model queries on CIFAR-10, without access to model details. On ImageNet, targeted C&W
attack and BIM achieve an `2-distance of 0.96 and an `∞-distance of 0.01 respectively. Untargeted HopSkipJumpAttack
achieves a comparable performance with 10, 000 − 15, 000 queries. The targeted version is not able to perform comparably
as targeted white-box attacks when the budget of queries is limited within 25, 000.
Visualized trajectories of HopSkipJumpAttack optimized for `2 distances along varied queries on CIFAR10 and ImageNet
can be found in Figure 7. On CIFAR-10, we observe untargeted adversarial examples can be crafted within around 500
queries; targeted HopSkipJumpAttack is capable of crafting human indistinguishable targeted adversarial examples within
around 1, 000−2, 000 queries. On ImageNet, untargeted HopSkipJumpAttack is able to craft good adversarial examples with
1, 000 queries, while targeted HopSkipJumpAttack takes 10, 000− 20, 000 queries.
5.2 Defense mechanisms under decision-based attacks
We investigate the robustness of various defense mechanisms under decision-based attacks.
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Figure 7. Visualized trajectories of HopSkipJumpAttack for optimizing `2 distance on randomly selected images in CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet. 1st column: initialization (after blended with original images). 2nd-9th columns: images at 100, 200, 500, 1K, 2K, 5K,
10K, 25K model queries. 10th column: original images.
Defense mechanisms Three defense mechanisms are evaluated: defensive distillation, region-based classification, and ad-
versarial training. Defensive distillation [33], a form of gradient masking [13], trains a second model to predict the output
probabilities of an existing model of the same structure. We use the implementaion provided by Carlini and Wagner [6] for
defensive distillation. The second defense, region-based classification, belongs to a wide family of mechanisms which add
test-time randomness to the inputs or the model, causing the gradients to be randomized [34]. Multiple variants have been
proposed to randomize the gradients [35–39]. We adopt the implementation in Cao and Gong [35] with suggested noise lev-
els. Given a trained base model, region-based classification samples points from the hypercube centered at the input image,
predicts the label for each sampled point with the base model, and then takes a majority vote to output the label. Adversarial
training [2, 3, 7, 17] is known to be one of the most effective defense mechanisms against adversarial perturbation [40, 34].
We evaluate a publicly available model trained through a robust optimization method proposed by Madry et al. [7]. We further
evaluate our attack method by constructing a non-differentiable model via input binarization followed by a random forest in
Section 5.3. The evaluation is carried out on MNIST, where defense mechanisms such as adversarial training work most
effectively.
Baselines We compare our algorithm with state-of-the-art attack algorithms that require access to gradients, including
C&W Attack [6], DeepFool [4] for minimizing `2-distance, and FGSM [2], and BIM [41, 7] for minimizing `∞-distance. For
region-based classification, the gradient of the base classifier is taken with respect to the original input.
We further include methods designed specifically for the defense mechanisms under threat. For defensive distillation, we
include the `∞-optimized C&W Attack [6]. For region-based classification, we include backward pass differentiable approx-
imation (BPDA) [34], which calculates the gradient of the model at a randomized input to replace the gradient at the original
input in C&W Attack and BIM. All of these methods assume access to model details or even defense mechanisms, which is a
stronger threat model than the one required for decision-based attacks. We also include Boundary Attack as a decision-based
baseline.
For HopSkipJumpAttack and Boundary Attack, we include the success rate at three different scales of query budget: 2K, 10K
and 50K, so as to evaluate our method both with limited queries and a sufficient number of queries. We find the convergence of
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Figure 8. Success rate versus distance threshold for a distilled model, a region-based classifier and an adversarially trained model
on MNIST. Blue, magenta, cyan and orange lines are used for HopSkipJumpAttack and Boundary Attack at the budget of 1K, 2K,
10K and 50K respectively. Different attacks are plotted with different line styles. An amplified figure is included near the critical
`∞-distance of 0.3 for adversarial training.
HopSkipJumpAttack becomes unstable on region-based classification, resulting from the difficulty of locating the boundary
in the binary search step when uncertainty is increased near the boundary. Thus, we increase the binary search threshold to
0.01 to resolve this issue.
Results Figure 8 shows the success rate of various attacks at different distance thresholds for the three defense mechanisms.
On all of the three defenses, HopSkipJumpAttack demonstrates similar or superior performance compared to state-of-the-art
white-box attacks with sufficient model queries. Even with only 1K-2K model queries, it also achieves acceptable perfor-
mance, although worse than the best white-box attacks. With sufficient queries, Boundary Attack achieves a comparable
performance under the `2-distance metric. But it is not able to generate any adversarial examples when the number of queries
is limited to 1, 000. We think this is because the strength of our batch gradient direction estimate over the random walk step
in Boundary Attack becomes more explicit when there is uncertainty or non-smoothness near the decision boundary. We
also observe that Boundary Attack does not work in optimizing the `∞-distance metric for adversarial examples, making it
difficult to evaluate defenses designed for `∞ distance, such as adversarial training proposed by Madry et al. [7].
On a distilled model, when the `∞-distance is thresholded at 0.3, a perturbation size proposed by Madry et al. [7] to measure
adversarial robustness, HopSkipJumpAttack achieves success rates of 86% and 99% with 1K and 50K queries respectively.
At an `2-distance of 3.0, the success rate is 91% with 2K queries. HopSkipJumpAttack achieves a comparable performance
with C&W attack under both distance metrics with 10K-50K queries. Also, gradient masking [13] by defensive distillation
does not have a large influence on the query efficiency of HopSkipJumpAttack, indicating that the gradient direction estimate
is robust under the setting where the model does not have useful gradients for certain white-box attacks.
On region-based classification, with 2K queries, HopSkipJumpAttack achieves success rates of 82% and 93% at the same
`∞- and `2-distance thresholds respectively. With 10K-50K queries, it is able to achieve a comparable performance to BPDA,
a white-box attack tailored to such defense mechanisms. On the other hand, we observe that HopSkipJumpAttack converges
slightly slower on region-based classification than itself on ordinary models, which is because stochasticity near the boundary
may prevent binary search in HopSkipJumpAttack from locating the boundary accurately.
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Figure 9. Median `2 distance versus number of model
queries on MNIST with binarization + random forest. The
threshold of binarization is set to be 0.1 and 0.5 respectively.
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Figure 10. Success rate versus distance threshold on MNIST
with binarization + random forest. The threshold of binariza-
tion is set to be 0.1 and 0.5 respectively.
On an adversarially trained model, HopSkipJumpAttack achieves a success rate of 11.0% with 50K queries when the `∞-
distance is thresholded at 0.3. As a comparison, BIM has a success rate of 7.4% at the given distance threshold. The
success rate of `∞-HopSkipJumpAttack transfers to an accuracy of 87.58% on adversarially perturbed data, close to the state-
of-the-art performance achieved by white-box attacks.4 With 1K queries, HopSkipJumpAttack also achieves comparable
performance to BIM and C&W attack.
5.3 Model without gradients
In this section, we evaluate HopSkipJumpAttack on a model without gradients. We aim to show HopSkipJumpAttack is
able to craft adversarial examples under weaker conditions, such as non-differentiable models, or even discontinuous input
transform.
Concretely, we implement input binarization followed by a random forest on MNIST. Binarization transforms an input image
to an array of {0, 1}, but transforming all pixels larger than a given threshold to 1, and all pixels smaller than the threshold to
0. The algorithm for training random forests applies bootstrap aggregating to tree learners. We implement the random forest
with default parameters in scikit-learn [42], using the Gini impurity as split criterion. For each split,
√
d randomly selected
features are used, where d = 28 × 28 is the number of pixels. We evaluate two random forests with different thresholds for
binarization: 0.1 and 0.5. With the first threshold, the model achieves the highest accuracy, 96%, on natural test data. The
second threshold yields the most robust performance under adversarial perturbation, with accuracy 94.5% on natural test data.
For both Boundary Attack and HopSkipJumpAttack, we adopt the same initialization and hyper-parameters as in Section 5.1.
The original image (with real values) is used as input to both attacks for model queries. When an image is fed into the model
by the attacker, the model processes the image with binarization first, followed by the random forest. Such a design preserves
the black-box assumption for decision-based attacks. We only focus on untargeted `2 attack here. Note that over 91% of the
pixels on MNIST are either greater than 0.9 or less than 0.1, and thus require a perturbation of size at least 0.4 to change their
outputs after being thresholded by 0.5. This fact makes `∞ perturbation inappropriate for crafting adversarial examples.
Figure 9 shows the median distance (on a log scale) against the queries, with the first and third quartiles used as lower and up-
per error bars. Figure 10 shows the success rate against the distance threshold. When the threshold is set to be 0.1, the random
forest with binarization becomes extremely vulnerable to adversarial examples. Around 96% adversarial examples fall into
the size-3 `2-neighborhood of the respective original examples with 1K model queries of HopSkipJumpAttack. The vulnera-
bility is caused by the ease of activating pixels through increasing the strength by 0.1. It also indicates HopSkipJumpAttack
and Boundary Attack are able to craft adversarial examples without smooth decision boundaries.
4See https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge
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Figure 11: Comparison of various choices of step size.
When the threshold is set to be 0.5, we have a more robust model. A median `2distance of 3 is achieved by HopSkipJumpAt-
tack through 3K model queries. It takes 25K queries to achieve 99% success rate at an `2 distance of 3 for HopSkipJumpAt-
tack. On the other hand, we observe that Boundary Attack only achieves a median distance of 5 even with 25K model queries.
This might result from the inefficiency in spending queries on random walk instead of “gradient direction” estimation step
in HopSkipJumpAttack. We remark that the concept of “gradient direction” requires an alternative definition in the current
setting, such as a formulation via subgradients.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we carry out experiments to evaluate the hyper-parameters suggested by our theoretical analysis. We use a
20-layer ResNet [31] trained over CIFAR-10 [27]. We run the `2-optimized HopSkipJumpAttack over a subset of randomly
sampled images.
Choice of step size We compare several schemes of choosing step size at each step. The first scheme is suggested by
Theorem 1: at the t-th step, we set ξt = ‖xt − x?‖2/
√
t, which we call “Scale with Distance (Sqrt. Decay).” We include the
other two scales which scale with distance, “Scale with Distance (Linear Decay)” with ξt = ‖xt − x?‖2/t and “Scale with
Distance (No Decay)” with ξt = ‖xt − x?‖2. We then include “Grid Search,” which searchs step sizes over a log-scale grid,
and chooses the step size that best controls the distance with the original sample after projecting the updated sample back to
the boundary via binary search. Finally, we include constant stepsizes at ξt = 0.01, 0.1, 1.0. For all schemes, we always use
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Figure 12: Box plots of the cosine of the angle between the proposed estimates and the true gradient.
geometric progression to decrease the step size by half until φx?(x˜t) = 1 before the next binary search step.
Figure 11 plots the median distance against the number of queries for all schemes. We observe that the scheme suggested
by Theorem 1 achieves the best performance in this experiment. Grid search costs extra query budget initially but eventually
achieves a comparable convergence rate. When the step size scales with the distance but with inappropriately chosen decay,
the algorithm converges slightly slower. The performance of the algorithm suffers from a constant step size.
Choice of perturbation size and introduction of baseline We now study the effectiveness of the proposed perturbation
size and baseline for estimating gradient direction when the sample deviates from the boundary. In particular, we focus on the
choice of δt and the introduction of baseline analyzed in Section 4. Gradient direction estimation is carried out at perturbed
images at the ith iteration, for i = 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60. We use the cosine of the angle between the gradient-direction
estimate and the truth gradient of the model as a metric.
Figure 12 shows the box plots of two gradient-direction estimates as δt varies among 0.01δ∗t , 0.1δ
∗
t , δ
∗
t , 10δ
∗
t , 100δ
∗
t , where
δ∗t = 10
√
dθ‖x˜t−1 − x?‖2 is our proposed choice. We observe that our proposed choice of δt yields the highest cosine of the
angle on average. Also, the baseline in ∇̂S further improves the performance, in particular when δt is not chosen optimally
so that there is severe unevenness in the distribution of perturbed images.
6 Discussion
We have proposed a family of query-efficient algorithms based on a novel gradient-direction estimate, HopSkipJumpAttack,
for decision-based generation of adversarial examples, which is capable of optimizing `2 and `∞-distances for both targeted
and untargeted attacks. Convergence analysis has been carried out given access to the gradient. We have also provided
analysis for the error of our Monte Carlo estimate of gradient direction, which comes from three sources: bias at the boundary
for a nonzero perturbation size, bias of deviation from the boundary, and variance. Theoretical analysis has provided insights
for selecting the step size and the perturbation size, which leads to a hyperparameter-free algorithm. We have also carried
out extensive experiments, showing HopSkipJumpAttack compares favorably to Boundary Attack in query efficiency, and
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achieves competitive performance on several defense mechanisms.
Given the fact that HopSkipJumpAttack is able to craft a human-indistinguishable adversarial example within a realistic
budget of queries, it becomes important for the community to consider the real-world impact of decision-based threat models.
We have also demonstrated that HopSkipJumpAttack is able to achieve comparable or even superior performance to state-of-
the-art white-box attacks on several defense mechanisms, under a much weaker threat model. In particular, masked gradients,
stochastic gradients, and non-differentiability are not barriers to our algorithm. Because of its effectiveness, efficiency, and
applicability to non-differentiable models, we suggest future research on adversarial defenses may evaluate the designed
mechanism against HopSkipJumpAttack as a first step.
One limitation of all existing decision-based algorithms, including HopSkipJumpAttack, is that they require evaluation of
the target model near the boundary. They may not work effectively by limiting the queries near the boundary. We have
also observed that it still takes tens of thousands of model queries for HopSkipJumpAttack to craft imperceptible adversarial
examples with a target class on ImageNet, which has a relatively large image size. Future work may seek the combination of
HopSkipJumpAttack with transferred attack to resolve these issues.
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A Proofs
For notational simplicity, we use the shorthand S ≡ Sx? throughout the proofs.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
For notational simplicity, let us denote τt := ξt/‖∇S(xt)‖2, so that the update (3) at iterate t can be rewritten as
xt+1 = αtx
? + (1− αt)(xt + τt∇S(xt)). (18)
Recalling our step size choice ξt = ηt‖xt − x?‖ with ηt := t−q , we have τt = ηt ‖xt−x
?‖
‖∇S(xt)‖ .
The squared distance ratio is
‖xt+1 − x?‖22
‖xt − x?‖22
=
‖(1− α)(τt∇S(xt) + xt − x?)‖22
‖xt − x?‖22
. (19)
By a second-order Taylor series, we have
0 =
〈∇S(xt), xt+1 − xt〉+ 1
2
(xt+1 − xt)THt(xt+1 − xt), (20)
where Ht = ∇2S(βxt+1 + (1− β)xt) for some β ∈ [0, 1]. Plugging equation (18) into equation (20) yields〈∇S(xt), −αvt + τt∇S(xt)〉+ 1
2
(−αvt + τt∇S(xt))THt(−αvt + τt∇S(xt)) = 0, (21)
where we define vt := xt − x? + τt∇S(xt). This can be rewritten as a quadratic equation with respect to α:
vTt Htvtα
2 − 2∇S(xt)T (I + τtHt)vtα+∇S(xt)T (τ2t Ht + 2τtI)∇S(xt) = 0. (22)
Solving for α yields
α =
∇S(xt)T (τ2t Ht + 2τtI)∇S(xt)
2∇S(xt)T (I + τtHt)vt ·
2
1 +
√
1− vTt Htvt∇S(xt)T (τ2tHt+2τtI)∇S(xt)
(∇S(xt)T (I+τtHt)vt)2
(23)
≥ ∇S(xt)
T (τ2t Ht + 2τtI)∇S(xt)
2∇S(xt)T (I + τtHt)vt . (24)
In order to simplify the notation, define∇t := ∇S(xt) and dt := xt − x?, which leads to
α ≥ ∇
T
t (
1
2τ
2
t H + τtI)∇t
∇Tt (I + τtH)(dt + τt∇t)
.
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Hence, we have
(1− α)2 ≤
(
1− ∇
T
t (
1
2τ
2
t Ht + τtI)∇t
∇Tt (I + τtHt)(dt + τt∇t)
)2
=
( 1
2τ
2
t ∇Tt Ht∇t +∇Tt dt + τt∇Tt Htdt
τt∇Tt ∇t + τ2t ∇Tt Ht∇t +∇Tt dt + τt∇Tt Htdt
)2
≤
( 1
2τ
2
t L‖∇t‖2 +∇Tt dt + τtL‖dt‖‖∇t‖
(τt +
1
2τ
2
t L)‖∇t‖2 +∇Tt dt + τtL‖dt‖‖∇t‖
)2
=
( rt + ( 12η2t + ηt)L ‖dt‖2‖∇t‖2
ηt + rt + (
1
2η
2
t + ηt)L
‖dt‖2
‖∇t‖2
)2
≤
( rt + ηt · 32L ‖dt‖2‖∇t‖2
rt + ηt · (1 + 32L ‖dt‖2‖∇t‖2 )
)2
.
where
rt =
〈xt − x?,∇S(xt)〉
‖xt − x?‖2‖∇S(xt)‖2 =
〈dt,∇t〉
‖dt‖2‖∇t‖2 . (25)
Let κt := 32L
‖dt‖2
‖∇t‖2 . Then we have κt is bounded:
κt ≤ 3
2
L
‖x0 − x?‖2
c
. (26)
Equation (19) and the bound on (1− α)2 yield
‖xt+1 − x?‖22
‖xt − x?‖22
= (1− α)2 · (τ2t ‖∇S(xt)‖2 + 2τt〈∇S(xt), xt − x?〉‖xt − x?‖2 + 1) (27)
= (1− α)2 · (η2t + 2ηtrt + 1) (28)
≤
( rt + ηtκt
rt + ηt(1 + κt)
)2
· (η2t + 2ηtrt + 1). (29)
We will show the convergence of rt to 1 in two steps. In the first step, we show λt := ηtrt → 0 by contradiction. In the second
step, we establish the convergence rate of rt to 1 based on the result of the first step.
Assume there exists a subsequence λti of λt that is bounded away from 0, such that λti > c1 for some constant c1. (Note that
we always have rt > 0 as xt is on the target side of the boundary for any t.)
Define θt :=
(
rt+ηtκt
rt+ηt(1+κt)
)2
· (η2t + 2ηtrt + 1). Then we have
θti ≤
( 1 + c1κt
1 + c1(1 + κt)
)2
· (η2ti + 2ηti + 1). (30)
As ηti → 0, there exists a constant c2 > 0 such that θti < 1− c2 for i large enough.
Because θt is an increasing function of rt, we have
θt ≤
( 1 + ηtκt
1 + ηt(1 + κt)
)2
· (η2t + 2ηt + 1) (31)
=
1 + 2ηt + 2κtηt +O(η2t )
1 + 2ηt + 2κtηt +O(η2t )
(32)
= 1 +O(t−2q). (33)
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The product of 1 + t−2q over t from 1 to∞ is finite when q > 14 :
Π∞t=1(1 + t
−2q) = exp{
∞∑
t=1
log(1 + t−2q)} (34)
≤ exp{
∞∑
t=1
t−2q} <∞. (35)
Therefore, we have
Π∞t=1θt ≤ Π∞i=1θti ·Π∞t=1(1 +O(t−2q)) = 0, (36)
which implies xt converges to x?, a contradiction. Therefore, λt → 0 as t→∞.
Now we can establish the convergence of rt to 1. We expand θt as
θt =
(1 + 2λtκt + λ
2
tκ
2
t )(η
2
t + 2ηtrt + 1)
1 + 2λt(1 + κt) + λ2t (1 + κt)
2
(37)
=
1 + 2λtκt + λ
2
tκ
2
t + 2λtr
2
t
1 + 2λtκt + λ2t (κt + 1)
2 + 2λt
+
η2t (4κt + (1 + λtκt)
2 + 2λtκ
2
t )
1 + 2λtκt + λ2t (κt + 1)
2 + 2λt
≤ 1 + 2λtκt + λ
2
tκ
2
t + 2λtr
2
t
1 + 2λtκt + λ2tκ
2
t + 2λt
+ η2t (4κt + (1 + λtκt)
2 + 2λtκ
2
t )
≤ 1− 2λt(1− r
2
t )
1 + 2λtκt + λ2tκ
2
t + 2λt
+ η2t (4κt + 2) (38)
≤ 1− λt(1− r2t ) + η2t (4κt + 2), (39)
where Inequality (38) holds for large enough t. As the product of θt over t is positive, we have
∞∑
t=1
log θt = log Π
∞
t=1θt > −∞. (40)
Given that η2t (4κt + 2) = Θ(t
−2q), Equation (40) is equivalent to
∞∑
t=1
λt(1− r2t ) <∞, (41)
which implies λt(1− r2t ) = o(t−
1
2 ).
As rt ≤ 1 and ηt = t−q , we have λt = O(t−q) and hence we have 1− rt = o(t− 12+q).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
The idea of the proof is to divide the unit sphere into three components: the upper cap along the direction of gradient, the
lower cap opposite to the direction of gradient, and the annulus in between.
Let u be a random vector uniformly distributed on the sphere. By Taylor’s theorem, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), we have
S(xt + δu) = δ∇S(xt)Tu+ 1
2
δ2uT∇2S(x′)u. (42)
for some x′ on the line between xt and xt + δu, where we have made use of the fact that S(xt) = 0. As the function S has
Lipschitz gradients, we can bound the second-order term as
|1
2
δ2uT∇2S(x′)u| ≤ 1
2
Lδ2. (43)
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Let w := 12Lδ. By the Taylor expansion and the bound on the second order term by eigenvalues, when ∇S(xt)Tu > w, we
have
S(xt + δu) ≥ δ∇S(xt)Tu+ 1
2
δ2uT∇2S(x′)u
≥ δ(∇S(xt)Tu− 1
2
Lδ) > 0.
Similarly, we have S(xt + δu) < 0 when ∇S(xt)Tu < −w. Therefore, we have
φx(xt + δu) =
{
1 if ∇S(xt)Tu > w,
−1 if∇S(xt)Tu < −w.
We expand the vector∇S(xt) to an orthogonal bases in Rd: v1 = ∇S(xt)/‖∇S(xt)‖2, v2, . . . , vd. The random vector u can
be expressed as
u =
d∑
i=1
βivi,
where β is uniformly distributed on the sphere. Denote the upper cap as E1 := {∇S(xt)Tu > w}, the annulus as E2 :=
{|∇S(xt)Tu| < w}, and the lower cap as E3 := {∇S(xt)Tu < −w}. Let p := P(E2) be the probability of event E2. Thus
we have P(E1) = P(E3) = (1− p)/2. By symmetry, for any i 6= 1, we have
E[βi | E1] = E[βi | E3] = 0.
Therefore, the expected value of the estimator is
E[φx(xt + δu)u] =
(
E[φx(xt + δu)u | E1] + E[φx(xt + δu)u | E3]
) · (1− p)/2 + E[φx(xt + δu)u | E2] · p
= (E[
d∑
i=1
βivi | E1] + E[−
d∑
i=1
βivi | E3]) · (1− p)/2 + E[φx(xt + δu)u | E2] · p
=
(
E[β1v1 | E1] + E[−β1v1 | E3]
) · (1− p)/2 + E[φx(xt + δu)u | E2] · p
= p · (E[φx(xt + δu)u | E2]− 1
2
E[β1v1 | E1]− 1
2
E[−β1v1 | E3]
)
+ E[β1v1 | E1] + E[−β1v1 | E3]
Exploiting the above derivation, we bound the difference between E[|β1|v1] = E|β1|‖∇S(xt)‖2∇S(xt) and E[φx(xt + δu)u]. In
fact, we have
‖E[φx(xt + δu)u]− E[|β1|v1]‖2 ≤ p
∥∥∥E[φx(xt + δu)u | E2]− 1
2
E[β1v1 | E1]− 1
2
E[−β1v1 | E3]
∥∥∥
2
+∥∥∥E[|β1|v1 | E1] + E[|β1|v1 | E3]− E[|β1|v1]∥∥∥
2
≤ 2p+ p = 3p,
which yields
cos∠ (E[φx(xt + δu)u],∇S(xt)) ≥ 1− 1
2
( 3p
E|β1|
)2
. (44)
We can bound p by observing that 〈 ∇S(xt)‖∇S(xt)‖2 , u〉2 is a Beta distribution B( 12 , d−12 ):
p = P(|∇S(xt)Tu| < w)
= P
(
〈 ∇S(xt)‖∇S(xt)‖2 , u〉
2 ≤ w
2
‖∇S(xt)‖22
)
=
∫ w2
‖∇S(xt)‖22
0
x−
1
2 (1− x) d−32
B( 12 , d−12 )
dx
≤ 2wB( 12 , d−12 )‖∇S(xt)‖2
.
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Plugging into Equation (44), we get
cos∠ (E[φx(xt + δu)u],∇S(xt))
≥ 1− 18w
2
(E|β1|)2B( 12 , d−12 )2‖∇S(xt)‖22
≥ 1− 9L
2δ2
2(2/(d− 1))2‖∇S(xt)‖22
= 1− 9L
2δ2(d− 1)2
8‖∇S(xt)‖22
We also observe that
E∇˜S(xt, δ) = E[φx(xt + δu)u].
As a consequence, we have established
cos∠
(
E[∇˜S(xt, δ)],∇S(xt)
)
≥ 1− 9L
2δ2(d− 1)2
8‖∇S(xt)‖22
.
Taking δ → 0, we get
lim
δ→0
cos∠
(
E[∇˜S(xt, δ)],∇S(xt)
)
= 1.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. For notational simplicity, we denote ξb := φx(xt + δub), and ξ¯ = 1B
∑B
b=1 ξb = φx. We use ξ, u to denote i.i.d.
copies of ξb and ub respectively. The variance of the estimate with the baseline is
Var(∇̂S(xt, δ)) = E
〈
∇̂S(xt, δ)− E∇̂S(xt, δ), ∇̂S(xt, δ)− E∇̂S(xt, δ)
〉
=
1
(B − 1)2
〈 B∑
b=1
ξbub − B − 1
B
E[ξu]− ξ¯ub,
B∑
b=1
ξbub − B − 1
B
E[ξu]− ξ¯ub
〉
=
1
(B − 1)2
B∑
a,b=1
〈
ξaua − E[ξu]− (ξ¯ua − 1
B
E[ξu]), ξbub − E[ξu]− (ξ¯ub − 1
B
E[ξu])
〉
When a 6= b, the summand can be simplified by independence of ua, ub and independence of ξaua, ξbub. In fact,
E
〈
ξaua − E[ξu]− (ξ¯ua − 1
B
E[ξu]), ξbub − E[ξu]− (ξ¯ub − 1
B
E[ξu])
〉
= −2E
〈
ξaua − E[ξu], ξ¯ub − 1
B
E[ξu]
〉
+ E
〈
ξ¯ua − 1
B
E[ξu], ξ¯ub − 1
B
E[ξu]
〉
= −2E
〈
ξaua − E[ξu], ξa + ξb
B
ub − 1
B
E[ξu]
〉
+ E
〈ξa + ξb
B
ua − 1
B
E[ξu],
ξa + ξb
B
ub − 1
B
E[ξu]
〉
= − 2
B
Eξ2a
〈
ua, ub
〉
− 2E
〈
ξaua − E[ξu], ξb
B
ub − 1
B
E[ξu]
〉
+ E[
(ξa + ξb)
2
B2
〈ua, ub〉]− 2
B
E[ξu]E[
ξb
B
ub] +
1
B2
‖E[ξu]‖22
= 0 + 0 + (
2
B2
− 2
B2
+
1
B2
)‖E[ξu]‖22
=
1
B2
‖E[ξu]‖22.
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When a = b, each summand becomes:
E
∥∥∥ξaua − E[ξu]− (ξ¯ua − 1
B
E[ξu])
∥∥∥2
2
= E
∥∥∥ξaua − E[ξu]∥∥∥2
2
− 2E
〈
ξaua − E[ξu], ξ¯ua − 1
B
E[ξu]
〉
+ E‖ξ¯ua − 1
B
E[ξu]‖22
= E
∥∥∥ξaua − E[ξu]∥∥∥2
2
− 2E
〈
ξaua, ξ¯ua
〉
+
2
B
‖E[ξu]‖22 + E‖ξ¯ua‖22 −
2
B
〈E[ξ¯ua],E[ξu]〉+ 1
B2
‖E[ξu]‖22
= E
∥∥∥ξaua − E[ξu]∥∥∥2
2
− 2E[ξ¯ξa] + Eξ¯2 + 2B − 1
B2
‖E[ξu]‖2.
Therefore, the variance can be written as
Var(∇̂S(xt, δ)) = 1
(B − 1)2
B∑
a=1
(
E
∥∥∥ξaua − E[ξu]∥∥∥2
2
− 2E[ξ¯ξa] + Eξ¯2 + ( 2
B
− 1
B2
)‖E[ξu]‖2
)
+
‖Eξu‖22
B(B − 1)
=
B2Var(∇˜S(xt, δ))
(B − 1)2 −
BE[ξ¯2]
(B − 1)2 +
(3B − 2)‖E[ξu]‖22
B(B − 1)2
≤ B
2Var(∇˜S(xt, δ))
(B − 1)2 −
BE[ξ¯2]
(B − 1)2 +
3B − 2
B(B − 1)2 . (45)
The middle term can be expanded as
− B
(B − 1)2E[ξ¯
2]
= − B
(B − 1)2
B∑
a,b=1
E[ξaξb]
= − 1
(B − 1)2B (B · 1 +B(B − 1) · (2Eξ − 1)
2)
= − 1
(B − 1)2 −
4
B − 1(Eξ −
1
2
)2)
Plugging into Equation (45), we get
Var(∇̂S(xt, δ)) ≤ B
2
(B − 1)2Var(∇˜S(xt, δ)) +
2
B(B − 1)(1− 2B(E[ξ]−
1
2
)2)
= Var(∇˜S(xt, δ))
{
1 +
2B − 1
(B − 1)2 −
2
σ2(B − 1)
(
2B(E[ξ]− 1
2
)2 − 1)}.
When E[ξ] satisfies (E[ξ]− 12 )2 > 12B (1 + 2B−12B−2σ2), we have
2B − 1
(B − 1)2 <
2
σ2(B − 1)(2B(E[ξ]−
1
2
)2 − 1),
which implies Var(∇̂S(xt, δ)) < Var(∇˜S(xt, δ)).
B Connection to existing white-box attacks
In this subsection, we discuss the connection between our proposed updates (7) and (8), and existing white-box attacks.
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Connecting the update (7) to penalty methods A common approach to the constrained problem (2) is to approximate it
with a penalty function formulation [43]:
min
x
1
2
‖x− x?‖22 − ρSx?(x), (46)
for a carefully chosen penalty parameter ρ. A similar relaxation has been proposed in previous work in adversarial attacks [1,
6].
At the tth step, the update of gradient descent is
xt+1 = xt − αt((xt − x?)− ρt∇Sx?(xt))
= αtx
? + (1− αt)
(
xt +
ρt
1− αt∇Sx
?(xt))
)
= Π2x?,αt
(
xt +
ρt‖∇Sx?(xt)‖2
1− αt︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξt
∇Sx?(xt)
‖∇Sx?(xt)‖2
)
,
where we rewrite the gradient update as a weighted average of the original sample x? and the t-th update xt perturbed along
the direction of ∇Sx?(xt) with an appropriately chosen size ξt. This has exactly the same form as our proposed update,
Equation (6). However, the hyperparameters αt and ρt in previous work [1, 6] are often chosen via hyperparameter tuning or
fixed as constant. Here, we choose choose αt so that xt+1 is at the boundary S(xt+1) = 0, which is a requirement to use our
proposed gradient estimate to be introduced in Section 4.
Connecting the update (8) to projected gradient descent In the untargeted case, each update of Basic Iterative Method
proposed by Kurakin et al. [3] is of the form
xt+1 = Clipx?,αt{xt + ξtsign(∇xJ(xt, ctrue))}, (47)
where J is the cross-entropy loss with respect to the true label c? = C(x?). The operator Clipx?,α performs per-pixel clip
within the α-neighborhood of the corresponding pixel of x?. As pointed out by Madry et al. [7], the Basic Iterative Method
can be interpreted as projected gradient descent in the `∞-norm.
We observe that the clip operator coincides with the `∞-projection operator Π∞x?,α. The cross entropy loss J is a monotonic
function of Sx? , and so introduces only a scaling difference between∇J and∇Sx? . As a consequence, apart from the choice
of αt, each update (8) of our algorithm has the same form as the Basic Iterative Method. On the other hand, we need to choose
αt carefully so that xt+1 lies at the boundary for gradient-direction estimation.
